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Abstract
In this paper we provide textual evidence on the sophistication of medieval deterrence
strategies. Drawing on one of the great opera librettos based on medieval sources, Wagner’s
Tannhäuser, we shall illustrate the use of optimal randomization strategies that can be derived
by applying notions of dominance or trembling-hand perfection. Particular attention is paid to
the employed randomization device.
JEL codes: B11, C72, K14, Z11, Z12.
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A very brief foreword.
Game theory provides extremely powerful tools to study social conflict and its applications
have led to many straightforward solutions to apparently tricky problems. But can these solutions,
provided by a theory that has basically been developed in the second half of the last century, be
expected to have informed decisions before then? While there was clearly gravity before Newton’s
∗We are grateful to Mark Armstrong, Jan Boone, Steven J. Brams, Anne Gundel, Michael Mandler and Jorgen
Weibull for many helpful comments and fruitful discussions.
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publication of Principia, the issue of how the formulation of a theory affects the behavior of the
objects it describes is less clear in the social sciences.1
In this paper we provide textual evidence on the strategic savviness of the medieval church.
Drawing on one of the great opera librettos based on medieval source, Wagner’s Tannhäuser,2
we shall show that the church employed optimal randomization strategies based on arguments of
dominance or trembling-hand perfection.3 Parallels to the related problem of how a state should
deal with crime will also be drawn.
Introduction.
Crimes are committed because they promise an immediate benefit. The law and law en-
forcement try to countervail the criminal’s incentives by threatening with deferred punishment and
it is up to the potential criminal–to each one of us–to weigh the immediate benefits and the de-
ferred costs when deciding about whether or not to commit a crime. A crucial role in this decision
is assumed by the probability of apprehension. This is different for the sinner.
The (Christian) sinner who believes in an afterlife knows that a punishment is waiting for
him for sure. The sinner will have to endure eternal sufferings in hell and for the range of usually
observed discount rates this should provide rather strong incentives for behaving according to the
rules set out by the (medieval Christian) church. However, there is one way out. The sinner can
repent and atone and, if met by a forgiving priest, can be granted absolution.
Obviously, the enforcement agency–be it the state or the church–wants to deter aber-
rant behaviour but the deterrence mechanisms are subtly different for the two. While the state’s
representatives have to take action to punish, the church’s have to take action to forgive. This
is the simple consequence of the difference between an ignorant state (that does not observe the
crime and has to exert effort to prosecute) and an all-knowing god (who does not overlook even the
slightest misdemeanor).4 The defaults are exactly opposite. If nothing happens, the criminal goes
1There is a small body of game theory literature with similar undertakings, see Aumann and Maschler’s (1985)
and Aumann’s (2003) studies of the Talmud, and Brams’ (1983, 1994, 2003) studies of the Hebrew Bible and other
literary sources.
2The opera’s full title is Tannhäuser und der Sängerkrieg auf Wartburg. It was premiered in Dresden in 1845.
3When we say “the church employed this strategy” we actually mean the church as portrayed in the opera and its
medieval sources, not necessarily the historical Christian church of the time.
4Brams (1983) argues that superior beings, like the God of the Old Testament, sometimes appear to make mistakes
and, thus, appear not to be omniscient. While we could make all the main points in our paper if we relaxed the
assumption of omniscience, the exposition is much easier if we stick to the traditional idea of an all-knowing god.
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free, the sinner is punished. Hence, deterrence should be much easier to achieve for the church (at
least when facing a believer) and one wonders why the church would establish an institution whose
purpose it is to weaken the default’s deterrence? An institution that offers a way out to those who
have done the very things the institution needs to discourage?
The answer is easily obtained and mirrors prominent arguments against the severest pun-
ishment offered by the state, the death penalty (which is the materialist’s equivalent to eternal
condemnation). Sinners and criminals alike who know that they will suffer the worst imaginable
punishment anyway have no incentive to return to a path of decent, good behaviour once the sin
or crime has been committed. They are condemned already and, hence, will seek any action hat
provides further immediate (net) benefits to them. There is nothing more dangerous than a first-
time murderer who knows that he will face the gallows regardless of what he does next if caught.
And while this may be particularly bad news for police officers trying to apprehend the criminal, a
condemned sinner is obviously bad news for everyone who surrounds him.5 Hence, both state and
church also want to provide incentives to those who have fallen from grace to behave well again.
This implies that there are two quite different constraints that will define optimal punishment tech-
nologies. Ex ante, an optimal punishment has to be severe enough to deter the crime or sin. Ex
post, there must be a “way out” for those who “cooperate with the authorities.” In modern game
theoretic terms the second constraint can be derived from dominance arguments or the application
of trembling-hand perfection: Even with perfect deterrence, bad things can happen, so you want
to be prepared.
While the state may have many variables to play with to meet both constraints (simply
because both, prosecution and punishment technologies, can be adjusted), we shall argue below that
the church has only one option to balance the two goals and that option involves randomization. If
absolution is always granted there is no deterrence. And if it is never granted there is no incentive
for the sinner to repent. Thus, the choice whether or not to grant absolution must be random.6
Equipped with modern game theory, both, the application of trembling-hand perfection
as well as the derivation of an optimal mixed strategy may appear straightforward. But then,
game theory is pretty much a toolbox developed in the late twentieth century such that it may
appear preposterous to expect that the same conclusions should have been drawn much earlier. But
5Similar perverse incentives are created by debt overhang, see, for example, Krugman (1989).
6Notice that the church cannot offer a “reduced” punishment for repentant sinners. It has only one “big” punish-
ment at its disposal–hell–and this necessitates randomization. Dante’s Divina Commedia, of course, knows different
circles of hell, but for each sin, there is exactly one pre-specified circle and again there are no rebates.
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in what follows we shall provide textual evidence from one of the great operas based on medieval
sources and dealing with medieval life, Wagner’s Tannhäuser, to show that this rather sophisticated
solution was well-known in pre-modern times. Moreover, we shall document how randomization
was achieved, namely by invoking the notion of a miracle.
The story and the model.
After being disenfranchised from his friends at the Wartburg Tannhäuser, a medieval Min-
nesänger, has chosen to visit the Venusberg, a place governed by the eponymous chieftain of sexual
pleasure–a big no-no according to Christian beliefs. Nevertheless he has a ball but, after a while,
gets rather bored and decides that he has to return. Soon after being back in the green fields he
missed so much he happens to meet his old friends from the Wartburg who, not knowing of his
great sin, invite him back. Initially hesitating, Tannhäuser decides to join them again once his
friends remind him of his former love, the immaculate Elisabeth. He is greeted enthusiastically
(not least by Elisabeth herself who has missed him quite awfully), and a song contest ensues that
is to decide who will get to marry Elisabeth. For Tannhäuser, who is better equipped than all his
competitors to win the contest, this is decision time. He can aggravate his sins by playing the part
or he can confess.7
Given that we know that he is a believer, the implications of not confessing are obvious
and dismal: The unrepentant sinner will eternally suffer in hell. But what are the consequences of
confessions? The story has him walking to Rome to confess to the Pope, hoping for absolution.8
But before telling the end of the story let us try to model the problem. Employing the most basic
game theoretic structure we can model the game between Tannhäuser and the Pope like this:
Stage 1 Tannhäuser decides about whether to sin or not. Sinning, visiting the Venusberg promises
substantial immediate gratification.9
7 In a companion paper, more hermeneutic in its approach, we deal specifically with the song contest and the
dilemma it imposes on Tannhäuser. For our purposes here though, we can abstract from this. Crucial is only that
he has to take the decision, sooner or later, whether to confess or not.
8Tannhäuser’s sin is exacerbated, as some authors argue, by having his life pledged earlier to Maria, the mother
Jesus (see Moser 1977 or Borchmeyer 2004). Thus, the sin Tannhäuser committed in the Venusberg is a violation of
his vow of celibacy. This is is why, according to the Roman Catechism, the absolution of Tannhäuser can only be
granted by the Pope.
9The music as well as Wagner’s stage directions let very little doubt about how pleasurable a stay in the Venusberg
is.
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Stage 2 (that is only reached if Tannhäuser has sinned at Stage 1): Tannhäuser has to decide
whether to confess or not. Deciding not to confess will bring him on a straight path to hell.
Stage 3 The church (the Pope in Tannhäuser’s case) decides about whether to grant absolution
or not.10
On the basis of what we have discussed earlier, it appears obvious that once Stage 3 is
reached the church should always prefer granting absolution to not to–simply because this ensures
that the sinner (Tannhäuser in this case) has an incentive not to continue with his aberrant lifestyle.
But this means immediately that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. Antic-
ipating that he will be granted absolution Tannhäuser, the potential sinner, will decide to go to
the Venusberg for a while and then repent (rationally expecting absolution once the deed is done).
This gives him both, the immediate pleasure and a stab at eternal life in heaven. Consequently,
the church has to commit itself in order to be able to achieve anything in this game. And given the
church’s rigid structure and its powers it seems reasonable to assume that the church can indeed
commit to an absolution strategy for Stage 3. Essentially, this means that we add a Stage 0 to the
game and drop Stage 3.
Stage 0 The church commits itself to an absolution strategy, i.e., it chooses a probability p ∈ [0, 1]
with which it grants absolution to a sinner who confesses in Stage 2.11
So, let us think about Tannhäuser’s payoffs in this game and let us start by normalizing his
payoff for not sinning to 0. If he sins (which provides him with some immediate pleasure) there are
three possible outcomes for him:
1. He gains the immediate pleasure in the Venusberg, repents and is granted absolution. This is
clearly better than not sinning at all and hence gives a strictly positive payoff that we shall
denote by b (> 0) as in benefit.
2. He gains the immediate pleasure, decides not to repent and to suffer in hell; a bad outcome
that we shall normalize to −1.
3. He gains the immediate pleasure, repents, but is not granted absolution; an outcome even
worse than the second because he has to bear the costs of atonement without getting any
10See also footnote 6.
11Notice that any such p is a pure strategy, i.e., the choice of a particular p means that the church will randomize
with that probability for sure.
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benefit. We shall denote the payoff in this case by −1− c with c > 0 denoting the effort costs
of atonement.
Assuming that eternal pains in hell are comparatively large we take it for granted that both
b and c are comparatively small. The church can now analyse Tannhäuser’s decision problem and
then decide on an optimal absolution strategy. From our previous discussion it is clear that, first of
all, the church wants to induce incentives for Tannhäuser not to sin. This obviously requires that
absolution is not granted too easily and could, in fact, be achieved by never granting absolution,
i.e., by basically abolishing Stage 3. More generally, however, it simply imposes a constraint on the
probability with which absolution is granted. Denoting this probability by p we can state the first
constraint on the church’s optimal strategy as
pb+ (1− p)(−1− c) < 0 (1)
which can be rewritten as
p <
1 + c
1 + b+ c
. (1’)
As long as this constraint is met, Tannhäuser’s expected utility from sinning is strictly negative
and he will decide not to go the Venusberg. Intuitively, the constraint on p gets tougher the more
pleasurable the sin (the higher b) and the smaller the costs of atonement (the smaller c). The
default, p = 0 , always meets the constraint and would be a good solution if the church could trust
on Tannhäuser not making any mistakes. However, with the slightest “trembles”, i.e., with the
slightest risk that, for whatever reason, Tannhäuser sins nevertheless, the church wants him to
repent. This imposes a second constraint:
pb+ (1− p)(−1− c) > −1 (2)
which we can rewrite as
p >
c
1 + b+ c
. (2’)
In words, the probability of absolution has to be big enough to make confession worthwhile.
Taking the two constraints together, we get
c
1 + b+ c
< p <
1 + c
1 + b+ c
. (3)
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Thus, there is an entire range of optimal strategies, all of which involve randomization.12 Assuming
that b and c are fairly small, the range is rather large. But if in doubt about which probability
to pick, the church might feel more comfortable to make sure that its first-order target (to deter
Tannhäuser from sinning) is achieved. Hence, it might wish to choose a rather small, albeit positive
p.
While we were able to derive this optimal strategy very easily, one may wonder whether
the medieval church or medieval writers who were thinking about the church could have employed
similar reasoning, reaching similar conclusions half a millennium before the advent of game theory.
The lesson from Wagner’s opera13 is that they obviously did–achieving the randomization in a
surprisingly elegant manner.14 So, let us now tell the rest of Tannhäuser’s story.
He walks to Rome, always seeking out the most stony paths and avoiding the shelter of the
shadows, as he wants to make sure that the pope takes his atonement seriously.
“The manner in which the heaviest-laden pilgrim beside me / took his way appeared to me too
easy. / When his foot trod the soft sward of the meadows, / I sought thorn and stone for my
bare feet; / when at the spring he would allow his lips to taste refreshment, / I would imbibe
the scorching glow of the sun;”
Alas, it is to no avail. When the pope hears that Tannhäuser has been to the Venusberg he
shows his most unforgiving side. As Tannhäuser reports:
“And he whom I so begged began: – / ‘If you have enjoyed such sinful delights / and enflamed
12To the best of our knowledge, Schelling was the first author to point out that optimal commitment strategies
might involve randomization–in his marvelous 1960 book. Notice, however, that the reasons for randomizations that
he discusses are entirely different from the one introduced here. In all examples Schelling gives, randomization serves
to lower the expected costs of a threat for the party who poses the threat. Cost reduction was probably also the logic
behind the idea of decimation–a punishment strategy used in the Roman army that involved randomization. Those
selected for punishment were divided into groups of ten; each group cast lots, and the soldier on whom the lot fell
was executed by his nine comrades.
13John von Neumann was, of course, a devoted Wagnerian and a reader of an earlier draft of this paper suggested
that we should check von Neumann’s biography to see whether he perhaps understood the convexifying role of
randomization after a night at the opera ...
14The sources Wagner was drawing on tell the same story such that we can trace the ideas we dicuss here much
further back. The original Tannhäuser legend was first told in 1515. A popular account of the story through which
Wagner probably learned about the legend is Ludwig Tieck’s story Der getreue Eckart und der Tannhäuser first
published in 1799. See, for example, Moser (1977) for more details on the genesis of the Tannhäuser story and
Borchmeyer (2004) for more details on the genesis of Wagner’s opera.
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your passions at the fires of hell, / if you have sojourned in the Venusberg, / then, now from
henceforth, you are eternally damned! / As this staff in my hand / no longer bedecks itself in
fresh green, / so from the burning brands of hell / deliverance can never blossom for you!’ ”
On the surface, this appears pretty much like p = 0. “[T]hen, now from henceforth, you
are eternally damned!” This does sound like game over. But the Pope continues with his speech
and careful reading does suggest there might still be a tiny bit of hope for Tannhäuser. The pope’s
staff–essentially a piece of dead wood–has to blossom again. If it does, so the implicit ruling,
Tannhäuser will be pardoned after all.15
Of course, the chances of this happening are slim. But, as believers know, miracles can
and do happen, so even if Tannhäuser is rather downbeat when he returns from Rome, we actually
know that p > 0. And we might also anticipate how the story ends–after all, what would be
the point of elaborating on this sophisticated scheme if it doesn’t come to effect? So, Tannhäuser
thinks he his damned and he reacts to this in a manner that shouldn’t surprise us at all: thinking
he is condemned anyway, he contemplates going back to the Venusberg!
“It drove me there where I had enjoyed so much delight / and pleasure on her warm breast! / To
you, dame Venus, do I return, / into thy magic’s sweet night; / to your court do I descend,
/ where your alluring charm will smile upon me now for always!”
But then–made possible through Elisabeth’s sacrifice (who dies in grief when she hears
from the Pope’s verdict)–the miracle does happen. As the choir of the pilgrims reports:
“It came to pass in the holy hour of night, / the Lord manifested Himself in a miracle. / The
barren staff in a priest’s hand / He decked with fresh green: / for the sinner in the fires of
hell / redemption shall blossom thus afresh!”
And so Tannhäuser dies–and goes straight to heaven:
“The salvation of grace is the penitent’s reward, / now he attains the peace of the blessed!”
A payoff of +b after all.
15Notice that such “staff miracles” were more frequently referred to in the medieval literature. In fact, there are
even other examples where the church explicitly demanded a miracle before granting salvation. Moser (1977) tells two
intruiging stories in one of which the required miracle involves a black sheep that has to become white for salvation
to be granted. In a second story a new-born child has to demand to be babtised by the sinner.
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Conclusion.
In his famous book, Schelling (1960) discussed various reasons for why agents might want
to employ randomization when it comes to threats and promises. The reason we discuss here, to
mitigate the effects of deterrence and offer the one who has fallen a chance to return on a path
of doing good, is not among them. In fact, we were not able to find any formalized argument of
the type exemplified here, an argument that, however, is well known in discussions about capital
punishment. In any case, it is derived easily. It follows simply from invoking trembling-hand
perfection (or requiring dominance). And, thanks to Schelling, there is also not much surprise or
awe when it turns out that the optimal commitment strategy in the game we study here, the game
between the sinner and the pope, involves randomization. The church wants to commit itself to
granting absolution stochastically.
Half a millennium ago, reaching these insights might have been far trickier. But as we
have learned from studying the example of Wagner’s opera Tannhäuser (that draws on medieval
sources) the church or, at least medieval writers who were thinking about the church, did solve the
problem optimally and did employ a very effective randomization device–the miracle.
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Appendix
This appendix provides the original German text of the translated parts cited in the text.
“Wie neben mir der schwerstbedrückte Pilger / die Straße wallt’, erschien mir allzuleicht: – /
betrat sein Fuß den weichen Grund der Wiesen, / der nackten Sohle sucht’ ich Dorn und Stein; /
ließ Labung er am Quell den Mund genießen, / sog ich der Sonne heißes Glühen ein;”
“The manner in which the heaviest-laden pilgrim beside me / took his way appeared to me too easy.
/ When his foot trod the soft sward of the meadows, / I sought thorn and stone for my bare feet; /
when at the spring he would allow his lips to taste refreshment, / I would imbibe the scorching glow
of the sun;”
“Und er, den so ich bat, hub an: – / ‘Hast du so böse Lust geteilt, / dich an der Hölle Glut
entflammt, / hast du im Venusberg geweilt: / so bist nun ewig du verdammt! / Wie dieser Stab in
meiner Hand / nie mehr sich schmückt mit frischem Grün, / kann aus der Hölle heißem Brand /
Erlösung nimmer dir erblühn!’ ”
“And he whom I so begged began: – / ‘If you have enjoyed such sinful delights / and enflamed your
passions at the fires of hell, / if you have sojourned in the Venusberg, / then, now from henceforth,
you are eternally damned! / As this staff in my hand / no longer bedecks itself in fresh green, / so
from the burning brands of hell / deliverance can never blossom for you!’ ”
“Dahin zog’s mich, wo ich der Wonn’ und Lust / so viel genoß an ihrer warmen Brust! – / Zu dir,
Frau Venus, kehr’ ich wieder, / in deiner Zauber holde Nacht; / zu deinem Hof steig’ ich darnieder,
/ wo nun dein Reiz mir ewig lacht!”
“It drove me there where I had enjoyed so much delight / and pleasure on her warm breast! / To
you, dame Venus, do I return, / into thy magic’s sweet night; / to your court do I descend, / where
your alluring charm will smile upon me now for always!”
“Es tat in nächtlich heil’ger Stund’ / der Herr sich durch ein Wunder kund: / den dürren Stab in
Priesters Hand / hat er geschmückt mit frischem Grün: / dem Sünder in der Hölle Brand / soll
so Erlösung neu erblühn!”
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“It came to pass in the holy hour of night, / the Lord manifested Himself in a miracle. / The
barren staff in a priest’s hand / He decked with fresh green: / for the sinner in the fires of hell /
redemption shall blossom thus afresh!”
“Der Gnade Heil ist dem Büßer beschieden, / er geht nun ein in der Seligen Frieden!”
“The salvation of grace is the penitent’s reward, / now he attains the peace of the blessed!”
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